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ABSTRACT 
When price controls alter the production schedule from one 
crude oil property, they can indirectly alter production decisions 
at other properties not subject to controls, even if the two properties 
are not related by physical production or demand effects. This 
occurs if (i) the property under price controls produces information 
as a joint product, (ii) there is a jointness of information between 
the properties, and (iii) the existence of fixed costs of beginning 
development on the non-controlled property allows the availability 
of information to affect total equilibrium conditions. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Federal regulations which set maximum price schedules for 
crude oil production are, without a doubt, a major reason for the 
recent increased interest in the effects of pricing policy on 
resource production. The papers of Burness [1976), Montgomery [1977) 
and Lee [1978) demonstrate that, due to the intertemporal nature of 
the fixed resource problem, price controls, even those which appear 
to be "nonbinding" in a static sense, will lead to altered production 
schedules by profit maximizing, competitive firms. In general, 
whether price controls lend to earlier or later resource depletion 
depends upon the rate of change of the spread between the world and 
controlled prices. Montgomery, based upon estimates of price behavior 
and of physical properties of oil fields, calculated that "if domestic 
oil producers had not been subject to price controls, and if they 
extrapolated recent OPEC pricing behavior, current (1977) U. S. oil 
production would be lower than it is now under price controls". 
The comparative statics of price controls is presented in Appendix I. 
Standard economic theory suggests that when price controls 
alter the production of some good X, other goods which are related to 
X through production techology or market demand will also be affected. 
In this paper, I will show that there is another way in which production 
decisions on seemingly unrelated deposits can be biased by the 
existence of price controls on one of them. This occurs if (i) the 
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property under price controls produces information as a joint product 
with the resource, and (ii) there is a jointness of information 
between the two properties, and (iii) the existence of fixed costs 
of beginning development on the non-controlled property allows the 
availability of information to affect total equilibrium profitability 
conditions. 
Existing work has focused on the effects of price controls 
on the production schedule of the directly controlled commodity. Yet, 
such controls may distort economic signals to owners of other resources 
and serve to alter their production decisions. There are many obvious 
ways in which price controls on one commodity, X, can directly distort 
the production of another good, Y. First, X and Y may be joint products, 
or their production may entail common costs. Likewise, the demand for 
X and Y may not be independent. For example, the market for natural 
gas is connected in both respects to crude oil production. In some 
fields, natural gas and crude oil are joint products. And, natural 
gas and crude oil derivatives are imperfect substitutes for many fuel 
purposes. 
There is also the possibility that regulations are written 
so as to bring Y under controls even though it is a different resource. 
For example, that most striking aspect of U.S. federal regulations has 
been the rather severe set of price·controls placed on "old" oil, oil 
from "properties" already in production at the beginning of the OPEC 
price increase. Other U.S. production has either remained free from 
controls, or has been placed under a much higher ceiling price. 
Presumably, the controls on old oil are an attempt to strip away 
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intramarginal rent from owners of crude oil with lower marginal 
production costs. However, "property" was defined by the Federal 
Energy Administration to be "the right to produce domestic crude oil 
which arises from a lease or from a fee interest".1 Yet, given input 
prices, production costs are determined by physical properties of the 
particular reservoir. But, if two reservoirs X and Y are covered by 
the same lease, production from them is classified together for 
purposes of determining old oil levels, even if production from 
reservoir Y is substantially more expensive than from X. On the other 
hand, if reservoir X extends beyond the "property" boundary, its oil 
can legally be produced at two different prices. The F.E.A. (now 
Department of Energy) has considered proposals to base the determination 
of old oil upon reservoir limits, but has dropped the idea because of 
the "enormous administrative problems associated with determining the 
limits of thousands of different reservoirs".2 
This paper examines one other manner in which production 
schedules may be interdependent. Production from the price controlled 
site, may produce joint products: the resource X and information 
valuable to the production of Y. The next section presents a model 
where it is reasonable to suspect that changes in the flow of the 
external information from X will affect the production of Y, 
II. INFORMATIONALLY RELATED PRODUCTION 
Let us now consider specifically crude oil production. The 
basis for analysis, following federal procedures, will be the oil 
"property". Assume that the output of each property is identical in 
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all physical aspects and that there are no differences in transportation 
costs. Let there be a single oil price trajectory, P , which is known t 
and is determined exogenously (say, by a perfectly elastic supply price 
announced by the OPEC cartel). Furthermore, let the physical production 
functions of the oil from each property be independent. This second 
assumption is not made because it is necessarily a good description 
of reality. Rather, it was noted in the last section that problems can 
be caused by production interdependence. The purpose of this section is 
to demonstrate some potential distortions which can exist even in the 
absence of direct production jointness. 
Next, suppose that there are two properties, Xs and Xv. 
X is subject to a price c.eiling and its output schedule is different s 
than in the absence of price controls. Xv is not subject to the price 
ceiling. By the above assumptions, the price of its output, P
t
' and 
its production costs C(xv) are unchanged. Nevertheless, there is the 
possibility for the price controls on Xs to affect the production 
decisions for Xv. Suppose there is a jointness of information between 
the two properties(in that production data from Xs also provide information 
about Xv) and the existence of fixed costs for well development of Xv 
allows the availability of such information to affect the total 
equilibrium conditions. If price controls on Xs 
lead to a change in 
the Xs 
production schedule, the flow of the external information about 
X will also be altered. The change in this external information flow 
v 
can affect the total profitability decision of commencing development 
on Xv. 
A simple example follows. 
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1 ·1 d Suppose there is ¢ probability that Xv will produce X oi , an 
(1-¢) probability that it will produce nothing. The discounted expected 
profits of developing the property starting today (when the true state will 
be revealed only after initial development is completed) are 
where 
$ ( f {P tx*vt - C(�t)} e -yt dt) + (1-$) (0) - F 
0 
x* Vt 
y 
C(x ) vt 
F 
the optimal output in period t if there 
is x1 oil 
discount rate 
production costs 
an initial fixed cost of commencing 
development 
As noted, F is some initial fixed development cost (such 
as constructing roads, locating a water supply, providing drilling 
equipment, etc.) which must be incurred before any extraction. If 
development is to be started today, t0, then F has to be paid while 
the true amount of oil is uncertain. 
However, beginning development today might not be optimal. 
(1) 
Firms must consider the global condition of when to begin development. 
The value of (1) may, in fact, be negative. Instead, development 
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might optimally be delayed until time t1 when the firm knows that 
it will receive a free signal which will disclose, with certainty, 
whether there is x1 or no oil in the property. Then, (discounting 
to today by s<tl-to)) the expected value of this development plan is 
(t -t ) (c1>[f00{p x* - C(x * )}e-ytd - F] )S 1 o t vt vt t 
tl 
(2) 
which can be positive even if (1) is negative because by waiting until 
t1, the firm can avoid expending 
F until and unless it knows for sure 
that x1 oil exists. 
It is at this point that the information connection between 
Xv and Xs should be clearly important. Suppose the signal at t1 is 
generated by the production from Xs' That is, production from Xs 
yields joint products: oil and information about Xv. A price control 
regime which alters the production of Xs will also alter the production 
of information about X . But information about X is valuable to the v v 
firm, and the decision to begin development can depend upon it. Even 
though price controls on Xs do not alter the marginal profitability 
conditions for Xv' they can affect the total conditions. Specifically, 
if production from Xs is speeded up, the firm which owns Xv may hasten 
the initial development date as the flow of information about Xv is 
quickened. 
Changing from discrete to continous uncertainty over 
reservoir characteristics does not change the principle outlined in this 
section. Nor do we have to restrict consideration to information which 
reveals the state of the world with certainty. All that is needed is 
that the firm prefer to wait for some future valuable information before 
beginning development. However, the result is vacuous if there is not, 
in general, information about Xv which is producted jointly with xs 
either because analogy comparisons are not valid, or because such 
information is not related to the production schedule. In fact, it 
appears that firms do use historical production data from more mature 
properties in estimating reserves at other prospects. In the Petroleum 
Exploration Handbook by Moody 11961] the use of "analogy" reserve 
estimation is discussed; 
Production statistics and reservoir data are available 
on older fields, thus enabling the geologist or engineer 
to calculate actual cumulative recoveries in barrels per 
acre or barrels per acre-foot for any given field or 
reservoir. Nothing is of more value to the estimator than 
historical knowledge of a similar reservoir. However, 
these statistical yardsticks should not be used as a 
substitute for judgment, but as tools to make judgment 
more accurate. 
In particular, cumulative recovery data, focusing on the 
pressure of the "drive" in the formation, are said to be useful in 
reserve estimation. 
It should be noted that the information from X about X s v 
may be, but need not be, a message which is external to a firm. 
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If the message is not external to a firm (because the same firm owns 
both properties) it should be argued that in planning production 
from Xs' the value of message about Xv is included in the calculations. 
In Appendix II, it is demonstrated that the result that price controls 
alter production incentives for the Xs property remains, although 
under some circumstances the way in which production is rescheduled 
may vary if the information is included in the calculations. 
Finally, this exposition has been presented in terms of 
"developmen�"· Using this terminology is not meant to exclude 
activities which are commonly called "exploration". To the extent 
that oil firms make the same information - sensitive calculations 
in timing of oil exploration, the same conclusions are a�plicable. 
Price controls can affect the pattern of exploration on 
non-controlled prospects if the timing of the exploration relies 
upon information generated as a joint production of the (altered) 
production schedule of the price controlled wells. 
III. CONCLUSION
There are many ways in which price controls on one oil 
property can bias the production decisions at a second property. 
The direct effects through production and demand dependence are 
straightforward. There are undoubtedly other areas, such as changes 
in price expectations or gaming against the controls themselves, 
which still need to be examined. This paper has shown that the 
distortion of information flows is also a possibility. While no 
attempt has been made to quantity or rank the various effects, it 
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seems that the use of inter-property analogy in petroleum exploration 
is considered important by petroleum geologists. 
[1977]. 
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APPENDIX I 
The following is adapted from Burness [1976] and Montgomery 
Let 
define 
Rewrite 
Pt world oil price trajectory, determined 
exogenously by O.P.E.C. 
p c 
<\ 
p t 
yt 
-
controlled price of domestic crude oil 
(assumed constant over time) 
(Pt pc) 
as p + a c t 
market discount rate 
production of petroleum in period t 
production costs 
resource remaining in period t 
The problem for the expected prof it maximizing firm can be 
considered a problem of optimal control. In the case of price control, 
the problem is to 
subject to 
max fTl{p x xt c t t 
0 
x t 
a.i) 
a. ii) 
a.iii) 
The Hamiltonian to be formed is 
H1 = {p x - C (x ) } e -y t - A 1x c t t t t 
the necessary conditions are 
cm
1 
ax-c 
c:m
l· 
axt 
lim 2 t+T 
0 p c 
=> 
· l 
-\ 
0 
p c 
C'"(x ) - /..1eYtt t 
- c"(x ) = ;..l Yt t te 
{(P x - C(x »•-yt -A1x } c t t t: t 
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0 
Likewise, the expected profit maximizing firm which receives 
the uncontrolled price for its output will act to 
b. i) 
a )x - C(x )}e-ytdt t t t subject to xt = -xt 
The Hamiltonian is 
and the necessary conditions are 
;m
2 
= 0 3xt 
=> 
(P +a ) c t c" (x ) t 
(P + a ) - c" (x ) c t t 
/..2eyt t 
/..2eyt t 
b.ii) 
b.iii.) 
• 2 -I­t 0
0 
Since the firm faces the same resource constraint in each 
case, there must be at least one point at which the production 
schedules intersect. Denote x as production at time t with tc 
controls, x as production at time t when the firm faces world tw 
prices. Totally differentiating a.i and b.i results in 
x tc 
x tw 
- y (Pc - C�(xtc)) 
C"(xtc) 
a - Y (Pc + Cl - C� (xtw))
C"(xtw) 
A.I.l 
A.I.2 
Let t be one such time at which the production schedules 
At time t
A.I.3 
which is positive, negative, or zero as y is greater than, less than, 
or equal to .9:. , the proportunate rate of change of the difference 
Cl 
between the world price and the price ceiling. If xA is less than tc 
*cw' 
the price control production schedule intersects the market
price production schedule firm above. If Cl is always greater than 
Cl 
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y, the rate of interest, there will be only one intersection point. 
In this case, production under price controls is initially greater 
than in a free market, and resource exhaustion occurs sooner. If 
the relationship between.&:_ and y varies, but � is greater than y at 
Cl Cl 
the first intersection point, then production rates before that 
point are greater under price controls, but the ultimate exhaustion 
date may be sooner or later. 
13 
14 
APPENDIX II 
Suppose the firm recognizes that production from Xs yields 
another good, information. Denote f (x ) as the value of information c t 
received from production xs at time t when there are price controls. 
Let f (x ) be the value when there are no price controls. At time 1, w t 
defined as in Appendix I as a time at which the production schedules 
intersect, the analagous equation to A.I.3 is 
x" tc x" tw 
If price controls do not change the value of the information, 
perhaps because (as was assumed in section III) Pt is exogenous, then 
x." tc x
" 
tw 
-a + ya which yields exactly the same 
conditions as A. I. 3 as long as C" (x�) > f" (xt). 
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FOOTNOTES 
41 Federal Register 4940, February 3, 1976. 
41 Federal Register 4938, February 3, 1976. 
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